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VI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the district court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment

for lack of service, resulting in lack of jurisdiction and a void judgment.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d
768, 771 (Utah App. 1997). This issue was raised in the motion to set aside the default
judgment. (R. 105,203-06.)
2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the

default judgment on equitable grounds justifying relief.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114 (Utah
App. 1989). This issue was raised in the motion to set aside the default judgment. (R.
106,208-11.)
3.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that the motion to set aside the

default judgment was untimely.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d
768, 771 (Utah App. 1997); Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752
(Utah App. 1990). This issue was raised in the motion to set aside the default judgment.
(R. 106,207.)
4.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that All American has no

meritorious defense to the action.

Standard of Review: Correction of error. Erickson v. Schenkers International
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994). This issue was raised in the motion
to set aside the default judgment. (R. 107, 211.)
5.

Whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff

without a showing of any legal basis for recovery of fees.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 U.A.R. 68,
72 (Utah 1997). This issue was raised generally by the motion to set aside the default
judgment, challenging all elements of that judgment, and specifically under "any other
reason justifying relief." (R. 98-109.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Relief from the default judgment is based on Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., set forth
verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 10.)1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for refund of life insurance premiums under a claimed ten-day
return privilege. The policies were sold by defendant Munyan & Associates and issued
by defendants All American Life, Midland National Life, and Liberty Life. Plaintiff
alleged that the claims were timely because the policies were supposedly never delivered.

Since entry of the order denying relief from the default judgment, Rule 60(b) has been amended to
delete ground (4), referring to the defendant's nonappearance for lack of personal service. (Add. 12.)
That ground was considered "ambiguous" and, in any event, is fairly comprehended within the former
ground (5), now listed as (4), referring to a judgment that is void. Rule 60(b), Advisory Committee Note
(Add. 11); see Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290-91 (Utah 1986) (discussing both grounds in context
of defective service). Amendments to procedural rules are presumed to apply retroactively, even to cases
pending on appeal. E.g., Long v. Simmons, 11 F.3d 878, 879 (5th Cir. 1996); see Rule 1(b), Utah R. Civ.
P; Rule 86, Fed. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, the amended version of Rule 60(b) applies to this appeal.
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(R. 1-5.) Plaintiff claims to have served All American by delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint on CT Corp., All American's agent for service of process. (R.
24, 34.) When All American did not answer the complaint, plaintiff took a default
judgment in the amount of $92,219. (R. 34, 41, Add. 4.)
However, CT Corp. was not served with process for All American; consequently,
All American was never notified of the action. (R. 142-44). Moreover, plaintiff waited
for eighteen months to notify All American of the default judgment, at which time
plaintiffs counsel simply telephoned All American and demanded payment. (R. 112-14,
178.) Within sixty days, All American filed a motion to set aside the default judgment,
demonstrating that it was not served with process and that, in any event, plaintiff had no
grounds for a ten-day refund because the policies were in fact delivered over two years
before the refund request. (R. 98, 112, 117-37.)
The district court denied the motion to set aside, concluding that All American
was properly served, that its motion was untimely, and that the underlying merits and
equities did not justify relief. (R. 229, Add. 1; R. 148-61.) All American appeals from
that order, which was certified for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b). (R. 230, Add. 2.)
The court stayed enforcement of the order pending appeal. (R. 244, Add. 8.)

2

All claims against the other defendants are resolved or unrelated. After obtaining the default
judgment against All American, plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of all claims against Midland and
Liberty. (R. 71 and 87.) The claims against Munyan & Associates pertain to their alleged fraud in
selling the policies and have no relation to the issues on this appeal. Those claims remain pending
following denial of Munyans' motion to dismiss. (R. 5, 217.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Beginning in 1991, plaintiff contracted with Munyan & Associates, independent
management consultants ("Munyans"), to procure life insurance policies on plaintiffs
employees. The policies were issued by All American Life Insurance Company, Midland
National Life Insurance Co., and Liberty Life Insurance Co. Plaintiffs employees
signed receipts acknowledging delivery of the All American policies between July 1991
and October 1993. (Complaint, ^ 10, Exh. A, R. 3, 11-12; Affidavit of J.W. Dewbre, ffif
5-6, Exh. A, R. 112, 117-37.)
In a letter to All American, dated June 9, 1994, plaintiff requested a refund of all
policy premiums under the "10 day free look" provision, which allows the policyholder
the right to return the policy for any reason "within ten days after its delivery." See
U.C.A. § 31A-22-423. This letter alleged various fraudulent activities by the Munyans,
but conceded, "We are confident these activities were neither condoned nor sanctioned
by US Life [All American]." (Complaint, Exh. B, R. 13.) On July 13, 1994, All
American responded to plaintiff, explaining that the ten-day return period had long since
expired, precluding any right to a premium refund. However, the response letter
requested additional information in order to investigate the alleged misconduct by the
Munyans. (Dewbre Aff t,ffif9-12, Exh. C, R. 113, 140.) Having received no ftirther
information from plaintiff by September 1, 1994, All American wrote once more to
plaintiff, believing the matter was concluded: "We assume all of these issues have been
resolved since we have not received this documentation." {Id.,fflj13-14, Exh. D, R. 113-
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14, 141.) While plaintiff claims to have sent a subsequent request for copies of the
signed statements showing delivery of the policies (R. 180), the record contains no
further correspondence between the parties (Dewbre Aff t, ^f 15, R. 114).
Over one year later, in January 1996, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action,
seeking refund of the policy premiums. (R. 1.) Plaintiff claims to have served All
American through delivery of the summons and complaint by a constable to CT
Corporation System, All American's designated agent for service of process. (Affidavit
of Chris L. Schmutz,fflf7-8, R. 177.) However, by some error or oversight, not yet fully
explained, the intended summons and complaint never reached CT Corp. Plaintiff
intended that the process papers for both All American and defendant Liberty Life were
to be served at the same time, by the same constable, on the same service agent, CT Corp.
(id.), but CT Corp. received only the summons and complaint for Liberty Life; it did not
receive papers for All American. (Affidavit of Sandy Streeper,fflf3-8, R. 143-44.)
Whether the constable misplaced or failed to deliver the summons and complaint directed
to All American, or erroneously believed the All American papers were clipped to the
Liberty Life papers when they were not, or clipped the All American papers underneath
those for Liberty Life, without specifying that there were two sets of process for two
different defendants, is unknown. Whatever happened, CT Corp. has no record of
receiving a summons and complaint for All American, and All American consequently
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received no notice of this action. (Streeper AfFt, If 9, R. 144; Dewbre AfFt, 1ffll6-l8, R 114.) 3
When All American did not answer the complaint, plaintiff promptly took a
default judgment, without making any further effort to contact All American or verify its
notice of the action. (R. 33-42.) The judgment, dated February 27, 1996, is for $92,219,
which includes the full amount of premiums paid to All American, plus prejudgment
interest, costs, and attorney fees. (R. 41, Add. 4.)
Plaintiff failed to send notice of the default judgment to All American, even
though plaintiff and its counsel had corresponded with All American prior to the action
and, therefore, knew precisely how to contact All American again, if they had desired.
Instead, plaintiff sent notice of the default judgment addressed to Michelle Rehrman at
CT Corp., All American's agent only for service of process. (Schmutz Aff t, ^f 9, R. 177,
193.) Because the envelope containing the notice of default judgment and the notice
itself were not addressed to any particular corporation or defendant, CT Corp. did not
know which party was to receive the document; accordingly, CT Corp. returned the

The constable claims that he served both sets of process on Michelle Rehrman, a CT Corp.
employee, with the All American summons on top, citing as proof Aw entry of her name "on the return
copy" of the summons, the copy he filed in the court. (Affidavit of Silvan D. Warnick, ffif 12-13, R. 16667, emp. added.) However, entry of the employee's name on the return copy of a summons can be made
at any time prior to filing and does not prove that a separate copy of the summons was actually served, or
that the documents actually served were in any particular order. The constable states that his "practice"
is to stamp the summons and write in the date and time of service and the name of the person served (id,
H 12, R. 166), but he obviously deviated from that practice by omitting the date and time of service from
the All American summons (R. 22), and leaving the stamp on the Liberty Life summons entirely blank
(R. 16). The constable also failed to document the time of service on the affidavit of service for either
defendant, as required by U.C.A. § 78-12a-2(3). (R. 18, 24.) Given these lapses and inconsistencies, it is
evident that the constable did not adhere to either legal or usual practice in the service of process in this
case, creating the likelihood that CT Corp. did not receive the All American summons, and that
Rehrman's name was written on the return copy of the summons only as an afterthought.
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notice to plaintiffs counsel for identifying information. (Streeper Aff t,fflf10-11, R.
144, 147, 192.) Plaintiffs counsel never supplied the requested information;
consequently, All American never received the notice of default judgment. (Id., ^ 12, R.
144; Schmutz Aff t,ffi[10-11, R. 177-78; Dewbre Aff t,ffif16-18, R. 114.)
On July 7, 1997, over sixteen months after obtaining the default judgment,
plaintiffs counsel telephoned J.W. Dewbre, All American's vice president and general
counsel in Dallas, Texas, regarding payment of the default judgment. Mr. Dewbre
responded that he knew nothing of any such judgment, but would investigate and
respond. The next day, local counsel for All American contacted plaintiffs counsel for
information, which was supplied. (Schmutz Aff t, ^ 13, R. 178-79; Dewbre Aff t,ffi[1617, R. 114.)
Within two months after learning of the default judgment, All American filed a
motion to set aside the judgment. (R. 98.) All American argued under Rule 60(b) that
service of process was lacking or improper; that All American failed to respond through
no fault of its own; that it had a valid defense to plaintiffs refund claim; and that
enforcing a default judgment of this high amount, including unfounded attorney fees,
was unjust under the circumstances. (R. 101-09, 199-212.) The district court rejected
those arguments, accepting plaintiffs arguments that service was proper, that the motion
was untimely, and that there was no other reason justifying relief. (R. 229-30, Add. 1-3;
R. 148-63.) As indicated above, the order denying relief from the default judgment was
certified for immediate appeal (R. 230), and All American commenced this appeal (R.
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232). The order is stayed pending appeal. (R. 244, Add. 8.) The Utah Supreme Court
subsequently transferred the case to this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah courts have traditionally been liberal in setting aside default judgments in the
interest of permitting disputes to be decided on the merits, especially when there is
reasonable justification for the defendant's nonappearance. To allow a plaintiff to retain
a judgment obtained without actual notice or a hearing, particularly when efforts to
prevent knowledge of the judgment appear intentional, is "harsh and oppressive."
All American is entitled to relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)
because the judgment is void for lack of notice and lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff failed
to serve CT Corp., All American's agent for service of process; moreover, it is
undisputed that All American received no actual notice of the action. Because service
was defective, the district court lacked jurisdiction, and its judgment is consequently
void.
All American is entitled to relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)
on grounds of equity and justice. All American has no culpability in this action, having
received no actual notice of the action or the default judgment. All American's service
agent also denies receiving notice of this action. If All American had known of the
action, it would have successfully defended the action and plaintiff would have
recovered no judgment against All American. By contrast, plaintiff failed to notify All
American of either the action or the default judgment, even though plaintiff knew All
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American's address and could have made contact if desired, as evidenced by the ease
with which plaintiff subsequently made demand for payment. Absent relief from the
judgment, plaintiff will retain an unfair windfall, being entitled to no recovery on the
merits of its claims.
All American's motion for relief is timely because the time limits in Rule 60(b) do
not apply to a judgment that is void. Moreover, the request for relief under 60(b)(6) is
timely because it was filed within a reasonable time. All American filed its motion
within two months after learning of the judgment. The expiration of eighteen months
between the judgment and the motion for relief is attributable to plaintiffs failure to give
notice of the judgment as required by law.
All American has a meritorious defense to plaintiffs claims, which are based on
the erroneous assumption that the All American policies were never delivered. All
American has presented unrefiited evidence that its policies were delivered over two
years before this action was filed. Moreover, All American has no liability for the
separate claims against the Munyons.
Finally, plaintiffs attorney fee award must be reversed because plaintiff has
identified no contractual or statutory basis for recovery of attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
Utah cases uniformly adhere to the principle that default judgments are disfavored
in the law because they deny access to courts for just resolution of disputes.
Accordingly, default judgments should be liberally set aside when the moving party is

9

not at fault and justice demands relief. These principles are plainly set forth in Interstate
Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980), reversing
a default judgment based on disputed notice:
[DJefault judgments . . . are not favored in the law. .. . Speaking generally
about such problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the courts for
the protection of rights and the settlement of disputes is one of the most
important factors in the maintenance of a peaceable and well-ordered
society. . . .
The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants
the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without
serious injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally
indulgent toward the setting aside of default judgments where there is a
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and
where timely application is made to set it aside. Consistent with the
objective just stated, where there is doubt about whether a default should
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end
that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law and
justice.
See also Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149
(Utah 1994) (vacating default judgment: "Generally, courts should be liberal in granting
relief against default judgments so that cases may be tried on the merits."); Katz v.
Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (court should be indulgent in setting aside default
judgment, and doubt should be resolved in favor of relief); Westinghouse Elec. Supply
Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contr., Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) (courts favor relief
from default judgments because "the very reason for the existence of courts is to afford
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them"); Mayhew v.
Standard Gilsonite Co., 316 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 1962) ("To clamp a judgment rigidly
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and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing.");
12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.22[3][a]-[b] (1998).4
Ordinarily, the standard of review for relief from a default judgment is abuse of
discretion; however, when the asserted basis for relief is lack of jurisdiction, resulting
from defective service and lack of notice, the district court has no discretion, and
entitlement to relief becomes a question of law. Accordingly, the standard of review in
this case is correction of error, and no deference is owed to the district court. See
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah App. 1997); Workman v. Nagle
Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 n.l 1 (Utah App. 1990).
Relief from default judgments is authorized by Rule 55(c), Utah R. Civ. P., which
provides that "a judgment by default" may be set aside "in accordance with Rule 60(b)."
Rule 60(b) states that "the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from
a final judgment" for any of the stated reasons. (Add. 10.) Applying this rule to default
judgments, the Utah Supreme Court has developed a three-part analysis for relief. As
set forth in State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983), a defendant
seeking relief from a default judgment must show that (1) at least one of the grounds for
relief in Rule 60(b) applies; (2) the motion for relief is timely; and (3) the movant has a
meritorious defense to the action. See also Erickson v. Schenkers International

Because a default judgment denies access to the court, such judgment implicates the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11, which not only guarantees that "every person . . . shall
have a remedy" for injury done to him, but that "no person shall be barred from . . . defending before any
tribunal in this State . . . any civil cause to which he is a party." (Emp. added.) Barring a defendant from
contesting claims filed without notice is equally unconstitutional as barring a plaintiff from suing on a
claim before it is known. See, e.g., Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1986) (striking
down statute of repose under open courts provision).
11

Forwarders, Inc., supra, 882 P.2d at 1148; Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah
App. 1987). Those conditions for relief from a default judgment are satisfied in the
present case.
POINT I:

ALL AMERICAN IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULES 60(b)(4) AND (6).

Rule 60(b), grounds (4) and (6), provide for relief as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment... for the
following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void; . . . or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. [Add. 10.]
Either reason for relief applies under the facts of this case, where service of process is
lacking.
A.

Relief Under Rule 60(b)(4),
A default judgment entered without service of process is void for lack of

jurisdiction. For example, in Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986), the plaintiff
filed a divorce complaint and purported to serve the defendant, who was in prison, by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the prison personnel office. A
default divorce decree was later entered. The defendant denied receiving the papers and
sought to set aside the default decree ten years after it was entered. The court granted
relief, reasoning that because service was defective, "the court was without jurisdiction
to enter the original decree of divorce." Id. at 290. After discussing both former
60(b)(4) and (5), the court concluded that "because of the ineffective service of
process . . . the decree is void for lack of jurisdiction." Id. at 291.
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This Court recently followed the same analysis in Bonneville Billing v. Whatley,
949 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1997). There, the plaintiff sued to collect a debt. Unable to
accomplish personal service, the plaintiffs attorney filed a false affidavit to support
service by mail and obtained a default judgment. Over three years later, the defendant
learned of the judgment and sought to set it aside, denying that he was served either
personally or by mail. This Court granted relief under former 60(b)(5), the voidness
provision, reasoning that "whether service of process was proper is a jurisdictional
issue," reviewed for correctness. Id. at 771. "[I]f jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment
cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs." Id. (citation
omitted). A judgment entered without jurisdiction is "void" and "must be set aside." Id.
See also Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 753-54 (Utah App. 1990)
(default judgment set aside as void for lack of notice to defendants); Skanchy v. Calcados
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 1998) (default judgment based on invalid service
is void); 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.44[3].
Similarly, the default judgment entered in the present case is void for lack of
jurisdiction because All American did not receive proper service of process. Plaintiff
claims that it served All American by requesting a constable to deliver the summons and
complaint to CT Corp., All American's service agent. However, the only evidence of
service is the return copy of the summons on which the constable wrote the name of a
CT Corp. employee with whom he was familiar. The return copy of the summons shows
no date or time of service, and the affidavit of service fails to document the time of
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service, as required by law. {See note 3, supra.) By contrast, CT Corp., whose business
is to receive service for nonresident corporations, denies receiving service for All
American. Moreover, All American indisputably received no actual notice of the action.
In the course of attempting to serve two defendants at the same time, it is likely that
plaintiff or the constable omitted or misplaced the All American summons and believed
that it was served, when in fact it was not. Accordingly, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the default judgment, and the judgment must be set aside as void.5
B.

Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6).
As noted above, Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a default judgment for "any

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." This is described as a
"catch-all" provision for relief, covering all possible grounds not enumerated previously
in the Rule. This provision is a "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a
particular case." 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.48[1] (citations omitted). It
"vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such
action is appropriate to accomplish justice." Id. (citations omitted). For example, this
catch-all provision may apply to grant relief from a judgment entered without proper

5

At the very least, because of the dispute in evidence over service of process, this Court should
vacate the judgment and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on sufficiency of notice. In
addressing a motion for relief from a default judgment, a trial court should not resolve factual disputes
related to service of process without an evidentiary hearing. See Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 913-15
(2nd Cir. 1983) (conflicting affidavits from process server and defendants "raised sufficiently serious
questions of fact to warrant an evidentiary hearing"); United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1122-25 (1 st
Cir. 1987); 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.44[4]. This course is consistent with the policy of
resolving doubts in favor of relief from the default judgment. E.g., Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA
Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980) (court improperly denied relief from default
judgment without evidentiary hearing to resolve factual dispute regarding notice).
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notice of the proceedings, in violation of due process. See Bish 's Sheet Metal Co. v.
Luras, 359 P.2d 21, 22 (Utah 1961).
Under Utah law, whenever the facts present a conflict, uncertainty, or confusion
regarding proper service of process and notice of the action, the courts exercise their
equitable power under Rule 60(b) to grant relief from the default judgment. For
example, in May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984), an assault action, the plaintiff
engaged in settlement negotiations with defendant's insurance adjuster before filing suit.
Id. Defendant was served with a summons indicating that a copy of the complaint was
available from the court clerk; however, the plaintiff later filed a second return of service
indicating that a copy of the complaint accompanied the summons. Following entry of
default judgment, the defendant sought relief, denying receipt of the complaint or notice
of the default hearing. Neither had the plaintiff attempted to contact the adjuster with
whom he had previously negotiated. The court granted relief under Rule 60(b), noting
that "the contradictions engendered in the service of process,. . . inconsistent returns,
efforts to reach a prelitigation settlement, [and] the immediacy in seeking relief... all
suggest justice in granting relief from a default." Id. at 1110. If "default would not have
occurred" but for the confusion over proper notice, "the ends of justice require an
opportunity for the defendant to have his day in court." Id. The court also observed that
where the parties had been engaged in negotiations prior to commencement of the action,
"courtesy and equity required" the plaintiff to advise defendant of his intent to pursue
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legal action. Id. at 1110-11. Under all the circumstances, "equity and good conscience"
justified relief from the default judgment. Id. at 1111.
Several similar cases illustrate this judicial readiness to set aside default
judgments when there is confusion and conflict over proper notice. In Woody v. Rhodes,
461 P.2d 465 (Utah 1969), the sheriff served one defendant, but the summons actually
named another defendant. Because the defendant served may have been mislead, the
default judgment against him was set aside under Rule 60(b). Id. at 466. In Locke v.
Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1955), the summons served on the defendant was not a
true copy of the summons filed with the court, creating uncertainty regarding filing and
service of the complaint. The court granted relief from the default judgment:
This situation created sufficient confusion that the motion to set aside . . .
should have been granted . .. consistent with our declared policy that in
case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow trial on
the merits. [Id. at 1113.]
See also Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 370-71
(Utah 1980) (vacated default judgment because of factual dispute over notice of trial
date); Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. West, 437 P.2d 214, 215-16 (Utah 1968)
(vacated default judgment because of "confusion" regarding notice, available defense to
the action, and "spirit of the rules" entitling defendant "to his day in court").
The foregoing authorities compel equitable relief from the default judgment in
this case. The parties engaged in preHtigation correspondence in an effort to resolve the
claims amicably. In fact, after a long period of silence from plaintiff, All American
wrote to plaintiff in September 1994 expressing the belief that "all of these issues have
16

been resolved." (R. 141.) Over sixteen months later, plaintiff commenced this action,
without extending All American the courtesy of notice regarding plaintiffs intent to seek
a judgment. See May v. Thompson, supra, at 1110-11. Plaintiff then obtained a default
judgment and waited another sixteen months before notifying All American of that
judgment. When plaintiff wanted to contact All American, for the purpose of collecting
the judgment, it did so with little effort. Upon learning of the judgment, All American
promptly sought relief by showing the absence of notice, the suspicion and confusion
surrounding alleged service of process, and the failure to give notice of the default
judgment. Plaintiffs entire course of action appears carefully calculated to conceal the
litigation and judgment from All American until the time limits in 60(b) had passed and
relief from the judgment appeared unlikely. Moreover, this course was followed with
full knowledge of All American's absolute defense to the refund claims. Not only would
default not have occurred with proper notice, but plaintiff would have recovered nothing
on its claims. See id at 1110; Dewbre Aff t,ffij11, 19, R. 113-14. Accordingly, if relief
is denied, plaintiff recovers an unjust windfall.
In summary, All American is not at fault, and vacating the judgment results in no
unfair prejudice to plaintiff. These facts, taken in the aggregate, require this Court, in
"equity and good conscience," to vacate the default judgment and allow All American its
day in court. Relief here is necessary "to accomplish justice."
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POINT II:
A.

ALL AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR RELIEF IS TIMELY.

Rule 60(b) Time Limits Do Not Apply.
Under Rule 60(b), a motion for relief under grounds (4) and (6) "shall be made

within a reasonable time." (Add. 10.) However, even this reasonable-time standard has
no application to a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction, based on defective
service of process:
There is only one exception to this [reasonable-time] rule, and that applies
to judgments that are totally void. . . . [T]here is and can be no time limit
on judicial relief from a judgment that is, in fact, already a nullity and
always subject to direct and collateral attack. Anytime is a "reasonable"
time to set aside a void judgment. [12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, §
60.65[1], citations omitted.]
Utah courts follow this exception in granting relief from judgments that are void
for lack of service. For example, in Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986),
discussed above, the plaintiff claimed to have served the incarcerated defendant through
delivery of process to the prison personnel office. Ten years after the default judgment
was entered, the defendant moved to set it aside on the grounds of defective service. The
court granted relief, holding that the motion was timely, regardless of whether it was
filed within a reasonable time:
[W]here the judgment is void because of a fatally defective service of
process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application. [Id. at
290.]
Similarly, in Woody v. Rhodes, 461 P.2d 465 (Utah 1969), discussed above, the court
granted relief from a default judgment one year after it was entered, based on invalid
service of process. Regarding timeliness of the motion, the court held, "The three18

months provision provided for in Rule 60(b) has no application to this situation." Id. at
466. See also Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, supra, 949 P.2d at 771 n.2 (granting relief
from default judgment after three years because "the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have
no application" to a void judgment).
As demonstrated above, the default judgment in the present case is void for lack
of jurisdiction, based on lack of service and notice to All American. Therefore, the time
limits of Rule 60(b) do not apply, and the judgment should be set aside.
B.

AH American Sought Relief Within A Reasonable Time.
Even if the reasonable-time standard is applied to the requested relief under Rule

60(b)(6), the equitable catch-all provision, that standard is met under the circumstances
of this case. See generally 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.65[1] (what time is
"reasonable" is not a fixed concept, but "depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case," citing cases in which relief was granted after several years). See also Ney v.
Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956) (granting relief from default judgment eleven
months after entry because defendant believed her ex-husband was responsible for the
claim). Here, All American challenged the default judgment within two months after
learning of it. The passage of eighteen months from entry of the judgment is attributable
entirely to the plaintiffs own failure and delay in notifying All American of the
judgment.
Rule 55(a)(2), Utah R. Civ. P., requires notice to the party in default, as provided
in Rule 58A(d). Rule 58A(d) requires that a copy of the signed judgment be served as
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provided in Rule 5. Rule 5(b)(1) requires that service of a judgment on a party be
accomplished by delivering or mailing the judgment to the last known address of the
party or the party's attorney. As applied by this Court in Workman v. Nagle Constr.,
Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), failure to give the notice required by Rule 58A(d)
does not invalidate the judgment, but noncompliance "is a weighty factor in determining
the timeliness of later challenges to the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) through
(7)." Id. at 751. Specifically, "if a losing party has remained ignorant of a judgment in
part because the prevailing party has not complied with Rule 58A(d), the resulting delay
is more reasonable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)-(7)." Id. In Workman, a delay of
fifteen months in seeking relief from the default judgment was considered reasonable
because the defendant's "ignorance of the judgment until that time was due in part to a
lack of notice that the plaintiff was required to provide." Id. at 752.
Under the foregoing authorities, All American sought relief within a reasonable
time because the delay of eighteen months from entry of the default judgment to filing of
the motion to set aside was due to plaintiffs failure to provide notice of the judgment in
compliance with Rule 58A(d). Plaintiff claims to have complied with the rule by sending
notice of the judgment to an employee at CT Corp., but the notice failed to specify which
defendant was to receive it. Consequently, CT Corp. returned the notice to plaintiff for
further information, and plaintiff failed to take any further action. Under the rules set
forth above, plaintiff was required to serve All American, not by mailing a copy to CT
Corp., the agent for service of process, but by delivering or mailing a copy to All
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American at its last known address. Plaintiff plainly knew All American's address
through the exchange of correspondence prior to filing the action. Moreover, plaintiff
had no difficulty contacting All American for purposes of collecting the judgment.
Given the ease with which plaintiff could have notified All American of the judgment, its
failure to do so can only be regarded as intentional, for the purpose of concealing the
judgment until the time periods in Rule 60(b) had elapsed and relief from the judgment
became more difficult. Under these facts, the timing of All American's efforts at relief
must be considered reasonable, and plaintiff should be estopped to assert that the motion
is untimely. See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1982)
(plaintiff may be estopped from asserting time bar where its own conduct, ostensibly to
allow the 60(b) time limits to expire, caused the defendant's delay in seeking relief).
POINT III: ALL AMERICAN HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE
ACTION.
The third requirement for relief from a default judgment is that the defendant set
forth specific facts showing a meritorious defense to the plaintiffs claims. State v.
Musselman, supra, 667 P.2d at 1057-58. The purpose of this requirement is "to prevent
the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are
frivolous." Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149
(Utah 1994). To be "meritorious," a defense need not be proven. "A defense is
sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried."
Id. at 1149. Whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Id. at 1148. For example, in Erickson, the plaintiff alleged negligence and
21

breach of a shipping contract resulting in loss of the goods shipped. The court held that
the defendant adequately asserted a meritorious defense by denying each basis for
liability and asserting affirmative defenses. Because the defenses were not frivolous,
they were entitled to be tried and justified relief from the default judgment. Id. at 1149.
In the present case, plaintiff seeks a refund of life insurance premiums under a socalled "10 day free look" provision, which allows the policyholder to return the policy
for any reason "within ten days after its delivery." See U.C.A. § 31A-22-423. Plaintiffs
complaint alleges that none of the policies was delivered fl[ 13, R. 3) and attaches a list of
the policies issued by All American, with the names of individual insureds. Upon
learning of the default judgment, All American responded with written receipts, signed
by each of the insureds, acknowledging delivery of the policies between July 1991 and
October 1993. (R. 117-37.) Accordingly, the All American policies were, in fact,
delivered over two years before plaintiff filed its complaint, and the ten-day return
privilege had long since expired. Therefore, plaintiff has no legal right to refund of the
policy premiums under the statute relied upon. Moreover, plaintiff has conceded that the
activities alleged against the Munyans "were neither condoned nor sanctioned by [All
American]." (R. 13.) Therefore, All American cannot be liable for those activities.
Plaintiffs claims, if any, should be pursued against the Munyans, who remain parties in
the district court, not against All American.
In summary, the defenses raised by All American are meritorious because they are
not frivolous and they are "entitled to be tried." See Erickson, supra, at 1149. In fact,
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All American's defense to the claims is absolute. Therefore, the default judgment should
be vacated to allow All American to assert its meritorious defense to the action.
POINT IV: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF
ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT A SHOWING OF ANY LEGAL
BASIS FOR FEES.
In the default judgment, the district court awarded plaintiff $1,000 in attorney
fees, plus an unknown amount of additional fees "expended in collecting" the judgment.
(R. 42, Add. 5; see Affidavit of Fees and Costs, R. 31, Add. 6.) However, plaintiff
demonstrated no legal basis for an award of attorney fees; therefore, the award must be
reversed.
"Utah has consistently followed the well-established rule that attorney fees cannot
be recovered unless provided for by contract or statute." Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa &
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). See, e.g., Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App. 1989) ("attorney fees are not recoverable in the absence of
a contractual or statutory basis"). Moreover, "[affidavits in support of an award of
attorney fees m u s t . . . set forth specifically the legal basis for the award." Rule 4-505(1),
Code of Jud. Admin. See Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187,
1194-95 (Utah App. 1993). Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 U.A.R. 68, 72 (Utah 1997).
In this case, no contract or statute authorizes an award of attorney fees.
Furthermore, plaintiff failed to set forth any legal basis for the award in the Affidavit of
Fees and Costs, as required by Rule 4-505(1). (R. 31.) Accordingly, the district court
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had no authority to grant an award of attorney fees in the default judgment, and the
award must, therefore, be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the default judgment and remand
the case to allow All American to answer the complaint and defend the action on the
merits. Alternatively, the Court should reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on
whether plaintiff properly served All American with notice of the action. In any event,
the award of attorney fees should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 7 ^

day of May, 1998.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Bv: ^^<^^C
*&T ? 2 < « £ ^
Gregory M. Simonsen
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, this 7***^
day of May, 1998, to the following:
Chris L. Schmutz
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
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Chris L. Schmutz
CHRIS L SCHMUTZ, P.C.
265 East 100 South # 3 0 0
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 3 6 4 - 0 2 5 6

Fil£DD!S7RSCT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV t 7 1997
SALTiD^EjCOUNTY
By Cepuy Q»k_

VQ±,

cMfrjl^.

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLASSIC CABINETS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY dba US LIFE, a New Jersey
corporation, MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE CO., a joint stock
corporation, LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE
CO., a South Carolina corporation,
LEON J . MUNYAN and KATHY L.
MUNYAN dba MUNYAN &
ASSOCIATES,

ORDER DENYING
ALL AMERICAN'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Civil No. 9 6 0 9 0 0 3 5 5 CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Against All American Life
Insurance Company (hereinafter the "Motion") has been submitted to the Court for
decision. The Motion was filed on or after September 8, 1997, and was
accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment Against All American Life Insurance Company, and the Affidavits of

J.W. Dewbre and Sandy Streeper. In.response to the Motion, Plaintiff Classic
Cabinets, Inc., filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment (hereinafter "Classic's Memorandum"), and the Affidavits of Silvan D.
Warnick and Chris L. Schmutz. Thereafter, Defendant All American Life Insurance
Company filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment.
Neither party requested oral argument on the Motion, and no oral argument
was presented to the Court.
The Court has carefully considered the Motion and all the foregoing
memoranda and affidavits, as well as appropriate pleadings in the file, and the
Court having fully reviewed the facts presented therein and the legal arguments of
both parties, and the Court having determined, for the reasons stated in Classic's
Memorandum, that the Motion should be denied, and other good cause appearing
therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Against All
American Life Insurance Company is hereby DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that there is
no just reason for delay and the foregoing is a final and appealable order.

a.

DATED this / / day of November, 1997.
"T

kO
Frank G.
Third Dis

2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLASSIC CABINETS, INC-, a
Utah corporation,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 960900355

vs.
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, dba US LIFE, a
New Jersey corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

The Court has reviewed defendant All American Life Insurance
Company's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.
reasons stated

in plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition

For the
to the

Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order,
Dated this

.day of October, 1997,

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Chris L. Schmutz
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, P.C.
265 East 100 South # 3 0 0
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)364-0256

^**^

**£?» -*.w- ;...._ --, J
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.

•,:.'-;

f.

i-ja J

FEB 2 7

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLASSIC CABiNETS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, ALL AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY dba US LIFE,
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
LEON J . MUNYAN and KATHY L.
MUNYAN,

Civil No. 9 6 0 9 0 0 3 5 5 CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

In the above-captioned action, Defendant All American Life Insurance
Company dba US Life ("US Life"), having been personally served w i t h summons
and complaint in the manner prescribed by law, and having failed to appear and
answer the Plaintiff's Complaint filed herein, and the time allowed by law for
answering having expired, and the Default of the said Defendant having been duly
entered; and the Court having received and fully considered Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Motion for Default Judgment, Default, and all other pleadings and documents in the
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file; and it appearing to the Court based upon the foregoing that Plaintiff is entitled
to Default Judgment and that the amount of Plaintiff's damages is established by
the foregoing pleadings and that there is no just reason for delay and that this
Default Judgment should be a final and appealable judgment under Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of this Court be
awarded in favor of Plaintiff Classic Cabinets, Inc., and against Defendant All
American Life Insurance Company dba US Life, in the sum of $ 7 7 , 5 2 2 . 1 2 , plus
pre-judgment interest in the amount of $ 1 3 , 5 6 6 . 4 2 , together with attorneys fees
and costs in the amount of $ 1 , 1 3 1 . 0 0 , for a total judgment of $ 9 2 , 2 1 9 . 5 4 ,
bearing interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry hereof; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this judgment shall be
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in
collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is no just reason for delay
and this Default Judgment is expressly directed to be a final and appealable
judgment within the meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this U

(day

of

\

,

VTJ^Q

, 1 996.

'-. v ^ W a n k G. Noel
- ^;;:^cE)1 strict Judge
1

'"• r U^-...*"'
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Chris L. Schmutz
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, P.C.
265 East 100 South # 3 0 0
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4 1 1 1
(801) 3 6 4 - 0 2 5 6

FEB2 7 t996

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLASSIC CABINETS, INC.,
AFFIDAVIT OF FEES
AND COSTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, ALL AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY dba US LIFE,
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
LEON J . MUNYAN and KATHY L.
MUNYAN,

^>o

y ^>^-

Civil No. 9 6 0 9 0 0 3 5 5 CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Chris L. Schmutz, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah Bar and am counsel for

Plaintiff in the above-captioned case.
2.

I have spent at least 10 hours in connection with pursuing the claims of

Classic Cabinets which are set forth in the Complaint filed herein; including
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investigation and research, preparation of complaint and summons, and preparation
of default pleadings against All American Life Insurance Company dba US Life.
3. I have billed my time at the hourly rate of $100.00 per hour.
4. I believe the time and hourly rate to be reasonable in connection with a
matter of this complexity, in the Salt Lake City area.
5. In addition to the fees incurred herein, Classic Cabinets has incurred the
following costs: filing fee for complaint ($120.00), and service of process on All
American Life Insurance Company dba US Life ($11.00).
DATED this / ^ > d a y of February, 1996.

Chris L. Schmutz
Attorney for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s ^ ^ T ^ d a y or hebruary, l y y b .

Notaiv Pubiic
TERRI L AHTER8URN
1025 South Lake Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
My Commission Expires
August 23, 1993
Stato of Utah

^
|
i
!
«

Notary PublicJ
Residing at: / ^ ^
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^ ^ ^
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BY DEPUTY CLERK.

Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669)
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant All American Life Insurance Company
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLASSIC CABINETS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF STAY AND APPROVAL
OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND

vs.
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY dba US LIFE, a New Jersey
corporation, MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE CO., a joint stock
corporation, LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE
CO.. a South Carolina corporation, LEON J.
MUNYAN and KATHY L. MUNYAN dba
MUNYAN & ASSOCIATES,

Civil No. 960900355 CV
Judae Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

Based on the Stipulation for Stay Pending Appeal and Approval of Supersedeas Bond
filed herein, it is hereby ordered that enforcement of the Order Denying All American's Motion
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to Set Aside Default Judgment is stayed pending appeal, and the proposed supersedeas bond is
approved.
DATED this

JAN 0 5 JS3§
day of December, 1997.
BY TI

Frank G."?
District

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

of December, 1997,1 caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Order of Stay and Approval of Supersedeas Bond to be mailed through
United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Chris L. Schmutz
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
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the verdict constituted
a new trial or to appeal
C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d
irdict failed to mention
one p a r t of a cause of
:iff failed to raise this
le j u r y was discharged,
waived and could not be
new trial. Ute-Cal Land
)5 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980).
"aimers' Union Property
n, 4 U t a h 2d 7, 286 P.2d
1955); Holmes v. Nelson,
Id 722 (1958); Howard v.
49, 356 P.2d 275 (1960);
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Watson v. Anderson, 29
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(Utah 1976); Edgar v.
.Utah 1977); Time Com.
11, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah
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ontiac, Inc. v. Osborne,
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I P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
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(Utah 1983); Nelson v.
37 (Utah 1983); Golden
tas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
705 P.2d 1165 (Utah
ied Washington County
R2d 679 (Utah 1986);
P.2d 618 (Utah 1987);
)P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987);
>2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App.
3o. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
>9); Paryzek v. Paryzek,
. App. 1989); Allred v.
tah Ct. App. 1992); Ong
th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d
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447 (Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d
1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v.
Shields 882 P 2 d 650 (Utah 1994); Commercial
Jay. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct.

App.
Utah
Lube
App.
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1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329
AJ
A TTi L n i
Adv.
1997); nPDQ
~ °Rep.
— n20
' (Utah
- Ct. AApp.
— mnrr\.
n^
Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah Ct.
1997).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L-R- — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or
settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
AL.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
AL.R.3d 126.
R§

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury h a s been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 AJL.R.4th 1170.
J u r y trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone new trial granted on ground of inadequacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
875.
After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R.
Fed. 189.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
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was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.)
A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e N o t e . — The 1998
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action." This basis for a motion is not found
in the federal rule. The committee concluded
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-

flict with rules permitting service by means
other t h a n personal service.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amendment deleted the former fourth ground for a
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the
Advisory Committee Note above, and renumbered the grounds accordingly.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
— E s t a t e record.
—Inherent power of courts.
— Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
— Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
— F r a u d or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.

No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure. .
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.
Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any o t h e r r e a s o n j u s t i f y i n g relief."
Subdivision (b)(7) embodies three requirements: First, t h a t the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6);
second, t h a t the reason justify relief; and third,
t h a t the motion be made within a reasonable
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time. Laub v. Sout
P.2d 1304 (Utah
Chipman & Sons, «
1991).
Where a defenda
ment based on Sul
his motion for a n e
violated Rule 5(a)
providing defendar
thereby causing si
tiff's failure to p ^
summary j u d g m e r
latter claimed was
plaintiff's part, the
lieved in denying
fraud was not pres<
ered a lapse in proc
Walker v. Carlson, r ,
1987).
Defendant's claij
tered into an ill-a
fully understanding
rectly characterizec
inadvertence, surpi
vision (b)(1); becaus
Subdivision (b)(7) cc
be used to circumv
period. Richins v. D(
P.2d 382 (Utah C t . .
In an action aga:
construction and mi
the county was nc
Subdivision (b)(7) b
ernmental immuni
Court decision spec;
relied on by the cou.
Hart v. Salt Lake Co
(Utah Ct. App. 1997
—Default j u d g m e i
It was not an abm
court to relieve a d(
allow her to answer
she had mistakenly ;
protected by a divorc
decree required her
gation and defend i
Harrison, 5 U t a h 2d
Trial judge did not
ing to set aside defa
dant asserted t h a t
was invalid and thei
it. Board of Educ. v.
P.2d 806 (1963).
Where any reasor
defaulting party, cou
granting relief from;
it appears t h a t to do J
tial
injustice
to
Westinghouse Elec.
Larsen Contractor, 5
Subdivision (b)(7)
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incorrectly stated the
that he had not recer
divorce decree; theref
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Kessimakis, 546 P.2d
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y the attorney of record of
isjgninent of the j u d g m e n t
executes such satisfaction
7 of the judgment, in the
.nstrument, duly acknowlr (2) by acknowledgment of
ter or attorne3 r and entered
n the county where first
id witnessed by the clerk,
judgment, or as to one or
all state the amount paid
lebtors, naming them.
court. When a judgment
satisfied of record, or when
lave been lost, the court in
-ed may, upon motion and
attorney of the judgment
ly enter an order declaring
faction to be entered upon
pt of a satisfaction of judgiged, the clerk shall file the
and enter it on the register
a brief statement of the
mount paid, on the margin
date of filing of such satislen a judgment snaiY have
rt, or as to any judgment
red upon the docket by the
extent of such satisfaction,
a lien. In case of partial
thereafter be issued on the
endorsed with a memorannd shall direct the officer to
or to collect only from the
e thereon.
?
action in other c o u n t i e s .
ent shall have been entered
•unty where such judgment
.nscript of satisfaction, or a
xh satisfaction, may be filed
t in any other county where
keted. Thereupon a similar
all be made by the clerk of
ave the same effect as in the
aally entered.
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rovisions of Rule 6 1 , a new
* of the parties and on all or
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new trial in an action tried
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stimony, amend findings of
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(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced a t the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or t h a t it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for m o t i o n . A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; t i m e for filing. When the application for a
new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party h a s 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) O n initiative of court. Not later t h a n 10 days after
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the
grounds therefor.
(e) M o t i o n to a l t e r o r a m e n d a j u d g m e n t . A motion to
after or a m e n d the judgment sftatf be served not later than 10
days after entry of the judgment.
R u l e 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t or order.
(a) Clerical m i s t a k e s . Clerical mistakes in judgments,
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) M i s t a k e s ; i n a d v e r t e n c e ; e x c u s a b l e neglect; n e w l y
d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e ; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action h a s not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) thejudgmenthas
been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more t h a n 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. Amotion under this Subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.

UU012

631

UTAH RULES

R u l e 61. H a r m l e s s error.
No error in either the admission or the exc)usJon
dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or ordei
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the pa
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action a p
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The co
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any e r i
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substi
rights of the parties.
R u l e 62. S t a y of p r o c e e d i n g s t o enforce a judgtne
(a) S t a y u p o n e n t r y of j u d g m e n t . Execution 0 r
proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue inured
upon the entry of the judgment, unless the cou>t j
discretion and on such conditions for the security c
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) S t a y o n m o t i o n for n e w trial or for j u d g m e n t . !
discretion and on such conditions for the security 0
adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the exec
of o r
'
. ^ P r o c e e d m g s to enforce, a judgment pendin
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or am
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for
from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60 o
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a dir
verdict made p u r s u a n t to Rule 50, or of a motion for ar
ment to the findings or for additional findings made tmr
to Rule 52(b).
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal fs 1
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, di^so'
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction durin
pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it c 0 ns
proper for the security of the rights of the adverse p^rtf
(d) S t a y u p o n a p p e a l . When an appeal is takei
appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a
unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law 0 r
rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of f\lin
notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supers*
bond is approved by the court.
(e) S t a y i n favor of t h e s t a t e , or a g e n c y thereof. >
an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of t J t f
an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any depart
of either, and the operation or enforcement of the jua§m (
stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be *-eq
from the appellant.
(f) S t a y i n q u o w a r r a n t o p r o c e e d i n g s . Where the d
dant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into o* U I
fully holding public office, civil or military, within this :
the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed d
appeal.
(g) P o w e r of a p p e l l a t e c o u r t n o t l i m i t e d . The pr 0 vi
in this rule do not limit any power of an appellate co^rt
a judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings or to s U S ]
modify, restore, or grant an injunction, or extraordinary
or to make any order appropriate to preserve t h e s t a t u s q
the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be ^ n t
(h) S t a y of j u d g m e n t u p o n m u l t i p l e c l a i m s , ty]
court h a s ordered a final judgment on some but not an c
claims presented in the action under the conditions stat
Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of t h a t j u d g
until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgmentmay prescribe such conditions as are necessary to sec;Ur
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the j u d g m €
entered.
(i) F o r m of s u p e r s e d e a s b o n d ; d e p o s i t i n l i e u of iJ
Waiver of bond; j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r s u r e t i e s to b e s^t i
in u n d e r t a k i n g .
( D A supersedeas bond given under Subdivision (d;
be either a commercial bond having a surety autho r i 2

